

Incertidumbre Electoral, Fragmentación Política y Coordinación de las Elites en Contextos Multinivel.
¿Qué factores han determinado el armado de Listas Colectoras en la Provincia de Buenos Aires?

Work in progress – Please do not cite.

Autoras

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Resumen

Este trabajo explora las variables que explican el emparentamiento de listas (*apparentment*) en la provincia de Buenos Aires.

El emparentamiento de listas es un recurso significativo para la coordinación partidaria entre niveles de gobierno en un marco de desnacionalización del sistema de partidos y de territorialización de la competencia partidaria. Sin embargo, la pregunta sobre qué factores determinan su proliferación aún no ha sido respondida.

La necesidad de un candidato nacional o provincial de ampliar su base de apoyo a nivel municipal a fin de reducir el nivel de incertidumbre, y de un candidato local de aprovechar el arrastre de la categoría superior en un contexto de fragmentación partidaria multinivel, teóricamente explicaría la existencia de colectoras. Por lo tanto, la variable dependiente será el número de colectoras por municipio y por partido en cada elección. Suponemos que el partido del intendente, el nivel de competencia (margen de victoria) para la elección ejecutiva local, y la concurrencia de elecciones ejecutivas provinciales pueden ser las variables explicativas del crecimiento o de la declinación en la cantidad de colectoras en cada elección.

Para testear nuestra hipótesis construimos una original base de datos de todas las listas emparentadas en cada municipio y para todas las elecciones entre 1983 y 2011 en el distrito. Los hallazgos del análisis de datos son confirmados por una serie de entrevistas a actores políticos provinciales y municipales.

Abstract

This paper explores the variables explaining the development of apparentment lists in the Argentine province of Buenos Aires.

Apparentments are a significant resource for party coordination across levels of government in a context of denationalization of the party system and of territorialization of electoral competence. Yet, what determines their proliferation remains unanswered.

A superior electoral category's need to widen its base of support at the municipal level so as to reduce uncertainty, and a local candidate's need to take advantage of that coattail effect in the context of a fragmented multilevel party system, theoretically explains *colectoras*. Hence, the dependent variable would be the number of apparentment lists (*colectoras*) per municipality and per political party in each election. We suppose that the municipal incumbent's party, the level of competition (margin of victory) for the election of mayor, and the coexistence of provincial executive elections can be the variables defining the growth or decline of the number of *colectoras* in every election.

In order to test our hypothesis we build an original dataset containing all the apparentments in each municipality and for all the elections held between 1983 and 2011. The database analysis' findings are confirmed by a series of interviews made to provincial and municipal political actors.

1. Introduction

"Si el modelo las requiere, habrá colectoras"¹

As frequently stated, the province of Buenos Aires is a peronist stronghold. Still, on Election Day citizens are exposed to a large amount of party ballots to choose from. In fact, the party system of this Argentinian province has remained notably stable through the years, being the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) the predominant one since last democratization in 1983. However, small parties operating election after election can be simultaneously observed. Hence, we face a paradoxical situation that could hardly find an explanation in the sole characteristics of the formal electoral rules.

So, how is it that in the context of a predominant party system, minor parties still survive? And, what explains the great partisan fragmentation at the local level?

To this question we propose the following answer: the observed scenario derives from the political strategy of apparentments developed both by large and small parties in a multilevel context, which confers survivability to the latter while benefiting both. We particularly refer to the so-called *colectoras*, by which different parties link their own lists of candidates for separate categories making up a single ballot. Usually, major parties promote this strategy as a means for collecting votes from the bottom to the top without building formal alliances or disputing votes with parties that may share similar electorates at the local level. In this respect, apparentments express the existence of what Escolar (2007) calls "ephemeral coalitions"². Meanwhile, incentives may also hold true for minor parties, which prefer to link their own lists to larger parties' candidacies in order to avoid information costs by becoming part of a well-known party label. By doing so, small parties can avoid the tough task of building organizational structures beyond their territory and even negotiate local offices and resources instead of competing for them individually. As a consequence, *colectoras* can diminish the coordination costs parties may face in a multilevel context.

That said, which factors explain the growth of apparentments across municipalities and time? To address this question we do a random-effects negative binomial regression analysis. Results suggest that the increase in the number of apparentments in

¹ "If the model requires it, there will be apparentments (*colectoras*)" February 9, 2011. Statement made by Fernando "Chino" Navarro in occasion of the publication of Decree 443/11 enabling "adhesion lists" (*colectoras*). Provincial legislator, Frente para la Victoria (FpV), 2005 - 2013.

² This concept suggests the existence of a non-vertically-integrated political game among national, provincial and local elites in every subnational district. It implies that coalitions can link different parties in the municipal-provincial level and in the provincial-national one (Escolar 2007).

municipalities is mainly related to competitiveness. That is, when the margin of victory decreases and the municipal NEP grows, *colectoras* are expected to flourish. Besides, apparentments seem to increase when the Mayor belongs to the PJ, but tend to shrink when provincial and/or municipal executive elections take place. Yet, the results exhibit some endogeneity problems based on the fact that the independent variables considered are all based on citizens' preferences, on electoral results. This suggests that the factors explaining the increase or decrease in the number of *colectoras* might most probably reside in intra-elite coordination aspects and coalition incentives that the model does not assess³.

We therefore examine the political reports of the main newspapers⁴ prior to the electoral processes of 2007 and 2009 when apparentments dramatically went up, and conduct a series of interviews to relevant municipal and provincial politicians. By doing so, we could qualitatively comprehend the results exhibited by the statistical analysis. Specifically, we found that despite the endogeneity problems, the statistical results made complete sense but they acquired a different meaning.

Moreover, by exploring the spatial distribution of apparentments, we consider the potential of its spatiality for evidencing certain territorialized political dynamics. A concentration of *colectoras* in the province's poorest and most densely populated area: the *Conurbano Bonaerense*, is found. This finding confirms the presumed correlation between *Peronism* and *colectoras*.

To empirically test our hypotheses we built an original dataset that brings together the data of all the apparentment lists (*colectoras*) in the province in the period between last re-democratization in 1983 and 2011. However, in order to respond to our second question, we exclusively analyzed the data between 1997 and 2009, for then is when the largest amount of apparentments emerged.

The paper is organized as follows. First we present and discuss the existing literature about apparentments in the United States while particularly focusing in Argentina. Then, we briefly introduce political and institutional aspects of the provincial political system. We thus assess the spatial pattern of *colectoras*, and put forward some suggestions on what it may entail. Later, we analyze the data and the variables related to the development of *colectoras*. Finally, we offer some closing reflections and discuss a future research agenda on the phenomenon.

³ La Nación, Clarín and Página 12.

2. Apparentments: a coordination strategy.

Electoral rules mediate voters' preferences and politicians' decisions, thus affecting electoral outcomes. As any other political institution, electoral laws are not neutral.

Electoral systems, often considered as the key element of constitutional orders (Powell 2000), have an effect not only on the chances of small parties of winning seats (Taagepera 2007) but also on the fractionalization of party systems (Duverger 1951; Rae 1967; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Norris 2004). They even affect political parties' strategic behavior (Cox 1997) including the formation of alliances (Blais and Indridason 2007) and organizational issues such as internal party cohesion, or even the nationalization of political parties (Cox and Knoll 2003).

Most electoral systems stimulate parties to ally in certain ways so as to foster their chances of winning seats or offices. Among them, apparentments: jointly sponsored candidacies, fusion, multiple party nomination, or cross-endorsements (Argersinger 1980, Scarrow 1985, Kirschner 1995, Michelson and Susin 2004, Bochsler 2010) have been widely neglected.

In fact, in Argentina empirical studies on the causes and effects of apparentments remain unusual. We presume this may mainly respond to the absence of reliable and systematized information in this regard as well as to the perception that *colectoras* are a negligible aspect that should not be taken seriously. But the widespread use of *colectoras* in Argentina, and specifically in Buenos Aires, evidences their political relevance. The lack of academic knowledge in this field is even more astonishing given that apparentments remain highly disputed in the political arena for they have shown to be strategically relevant. This is why a systematic research on these issues is of key importance.

In the United States⁵ it has been thoroughly argued that the statewide plurality method of electing president and governors, plus the single member-district-plurality method of electing national and state legislators, have made "third" party growth unlikely (Scarrow 1985). But, as Michelson and Susin (2004, 301) put it, the state of New York has had a long history of strong third parties because of a kind of apparentment: "fusion" or cross-endorsement. Even though apparentments practically disappeared after fusion was outlawed in the majority of states, New York state law still allows

⁵ Even though apparentments are currently used in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, and in Switzerland (Bochsler 2010), the comparison should better consider the US, for it is the only presidential system of them all.

multiple nominations (fusion), that is, the nomination of the same candidate to the same office in the same election by more than one political party⁶ (Kirschner 1995).

Considering the same case, Gary Cox (1997) refers to its cross-endorsement⁷ and cross-filling rules, as the electoral mechanisms which more clearly nullify the expected alliance-promoting and party-reducing effect of single member districts with plurality rule hypothesized by Duverger (1951). As Cox (1997) and Scarrow (1994) suggest, New York has had a stable multiparty system since 1940s, despite its plurality rule in single-member districts. We believe that in the province of Buenos Aires, a different apparentment mechanism: *colectoras* can yield a pretty similar effect by counteracting majoritarian mechanics of local electoral systems. Why? *colectoras* can pose higher electoral expectations in the hands of small local parties or factions joining larger parties or high yield candidates for a provincial or national office, that would otherwise get excluded from the system.

Regarding political elite's coordination⁸, fusion or cross-endorsements mean that electors can vote at local level for a minor party line without "wasting their vote" in a candidate unlikely to win, for minor parties can borrow large parties' high yield candidates nominating them as well. A similar logic resides behind a most party-centered type of apparentments based on the association of different parties' lists for different elective categories: *colectoras*. These features have a particularly relevant impact on the associational rights of minor political parties because, as Kirschner (1995, 683-684) affirmed while referring to fusion, "this practice represents the most effective means available for minor political parties to participate consistently in the electoral process." In fact, Scarrow (1985) claimed that in the US the institutional reforms passed in late 19th century aimed at eliminating fusion lists, ended with the more complex party systems⁹ in place at that moment. As stated, we consider that *colectoras* could be responsible for the persistence of a complex multilevel party system in Buenos Aires, counterbalancing the incidence of electoral mechanisms working in the opposite direction in municipal elections.

⁶ A candidate may appear on the ballot as the candidate of both the Republican Party and the small Liberal Party, as it was the case of former New York Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani in 1993.

⁷ H. Scarrow (1985) calls them *jointly sponsored candidacies*. Michelson and Susin (2004), like Kirschner (1995) talk about *cross-endorsements*, and Argersinger (1980) simply refers to *fusion*.

⁸ As defined by Cox (2000, 49; in Lago and Montero 2009, 176), "electoral coordination refers to a variety of processes by which groups of voters and politicians coordinate their electoral actions in order to win more legislative seats or executive portfolios".

⁹ The party systems within each of the states of the federation.

Apparentments are a significant resource for party coordination across levels of government and therefore for linking the different political arenas in a context of denationalization of the party system and of territorialization of electoral competence. Consequently, *colectoras* represent a useful electoral alternative in the context of a vertically non-integrated political game.

3. Apparenments in Argentina: Institutional Context and Legal Precedents.

Argentina is a federal and multilevel polity with a presidential executive and a bicameral national legislature, compounded by 24 subnational units (23 provinces and the City of Buenos Aires), which enjoy considerable formal political autonomy. Each subnational district elects its national legislators, governor and local legislators by popular vote. They all design their own constitutions and electoral rules.

Argentina has developed a multilevel party system (Sweden and Maddens 2008) notably denationalized in horizontal and vertical terms and consistently territorialized (Chibber and Kollman 1998, Gibson and Calvo 2000, Jones and Mainwaring 2003); a context in which the study of *apparentments* requires attention. Consequently, we study apparentments in the biggest province and undisputed head of the federation: Buenos Aires¹⁰.

As already stated, *colectoras* are a means of vertical inter-party strategic coordination derived from the electoral association of different parties' lists in a multilevel context with simultaneous elections.

Our main hypothesis is that apparentments enable the existence and subsistence of minor parties that would otherwise be displaced by the mechanical effects of the municipal electoral system. That is, we presume that the apparentment of lists may constrain majoritarian systemic effects and practices. In line with Cox (1997), apparentments can even limit the Duvergerian law stating that the number of viable parties or candidates is equal to the district magnitude (M) plus 1¹¹. Consequently, apparentments can solve the entry restrictions political parties may face.

¹⁰ Even though it would be better to make a comparative study considering as many provinces as possible, in this paper we only take Buenos Aires for information still has to be systematized in every province. This is a task we aim to take care of.

¹¹ As Lago and Montero (2009, 177) clearly put it, in a district two different $M+1$ rules apply: "first, the number of competitors entering a given race tends to be no more than $M + 1$. Second, if more than $M + 1$ parties or candidates enter because of a failure of the entry coordination rule, votes tend to concentrate on, at most, $M + 1$ of them. The $M + 1$ rule says that, under specified conditions, strategic voting will reduce the contest with more than $M + 1$ parties or candidates to one in which, at most, $M + 1$ competitors are seriously running for seats".

A first institutional feature that enables the existence of *colectoras* is a presidential and republican system replicated at the three levels of government in a context where these political arenas are nested¹² and where, as a consequence, political elites are “involved in a whole network of games in which what appears rationally suboptimal from the perspective of only one game is in fact optimal when the whole network of games is considered” (Tsebelis 1990, 7). Moreover, *colectoras* require the existence of concurrent elections among levels and a system of party ballots enabling the so-called *listas sábana horizontales*¹³ (single ballots containing lists of candidates for various executive and legislative categories either national, provincial or municipal). These institutional features have set the stage for the development of this kind of electoral mechanism in Argentina.

However, in Argentina the history of *colectoras* is not too old. In fact, advocates of this mechanism identify former president Juan Domingo Perón as its original promoter in the elections of 1946 when he was first elected. In 1946, the presidential formula Perón - Quijano went in two different party ballots: *Junta Renovadora* (UCR) and *Partido Laboralista*. Later, in 1973, the parties *Frente Justicialista de Liberación* and the *Frente Izquierda Popular* presented the same presidential formula: Perón – Perón. However, it is easy to appreciate that these precedents are not exact examples of *colectoras*, but clear cases of fusion. Fusion lists in Argentina are called *listas espejo* (mirror lists) i.e. two or more ballots (different party labels) with an identical list of candidates.

In Argentina any apparentment's reference requires mentioning another “young” devise: the system of double simultaneous vote (*Ley de Lemas*). This electoral method began to be implemented in 1987 in different provinces as a means for the peronist party (*Partido Justicialista*) to solve the coordination problems the party was facing due to a fierce internal dispute (De Riz 1992) that emerged after its first electoral defeat under democratic rules. So, between 1987 and 2001 ten peronist provinces adopted *Lemas* for the election of provincial legislators in order to limit the fragmentation of the peronist vote (Calvo and Escolar 2005, 24). Why? This system allows parties (lemas) to present multiple subparty lists (sublemas) of candidates for a single category. How? “Citizens vote for a single sublema list. To allocate executive offices and legislative seats, the votes won by all of the individual sublemas are first counted; then the combined number

¹² Tsebelis (1990) find two kinds of “nested games”: games in multiple arenas and institutional design. In Argentina, both kinds coexist.

¹³ In reference of the ballot size, which is wide as a “bed sheet” as it contains candidates for all the categories in the contest therefore getting the shape of a long rectangle.

of votes won by each lema's sub-lemas is tallied. This latter number is used to allocate the executive office or legislative seats among the lemas. Once a lema's allocation has been determined, the executive office or legislative seats are distributed among its sublemas, normally using the same method employed for the allocation among the lemas” (Jones 1997, 542). Therefore, this mechanism lets parties avoid internal elections as the votes of all the different factions (sublemas) are accumulated. However, since 1997 the system became useful for other parties (like the *Alianza*¹⁴) in need of solving their own internal problems. Nowadays most provinces have overruled it.

Although both *lemas* and *colectoras* are employed to the same end: solving coordination problems; the huge difference is that whereas the *lemas*' method is a means for solving internal coordination problems, *colectoras* solve coordination problems among different parties avoiding the need for formal coalition-making and fostering multilevel ephemeral electoral coalitions. Both systems are and have been criticized because of exposing political parties' strategies to the citizenship, for exhibiting their lack of unity or capacity of consensus, and for confusing the voter.

Bearing this in mind, we should refer to another phenomenon to which *colectoras* are intrinsically linked: coattails. A multilevel polity characterized by high levels of party denationalization, territorialization and incongruence both of party systems¹⁵ and electoral support, allows for the presence of coattail effects, and even inverse coattails effects from the local to the national arenas of competition (Ames 1994, Jones 1997, Samuels 2000, Rodden and Wibbels 2005). Coattails are not only an effect of concurrent elections for different electoral categories within a same party, but also a consequence of apparentments. The use of *colectoras* can thus solve the coordination dilemma of multilevel presidential democracies where institutional features create multiple opportunities for voters to render judgments about parties.

4. Electoral Design in the Province of Buenos Aires

Buenos Aires is the largest province, the most populated and most important one in economic and political terms: it is responsible for about the 33% of the national GDP, and its voters are about the 38% of the national electorate.

¹⁴ The “*Alianza por el Trabajo la Justicia y la Educación*” was a political coalition between the *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR) and the *Frente País Solidario* (FREPASO). Founded in 1997, it won the presidential elections of 1999. But it was rapidly dissolved in 2001 after the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa in december 2001.

¹⁵ “Data reveals that the trend over time in Argentina’s federalized party system has been a growing level of incongruence” (Gibson and Suarez-Cao 2010, 28).

As in some other provinces, since 1983 the provincial executive and most legislative and municipal offices have been dominated by the PJ.

The *Unión Cívica Radical* (UCR) took office only in 1983 when it also ruled the country. Since then, it has been mostly confined to municipal executive offices and to a few representatives in the provincial legislature. Even though there have been other parties in the province (*Partido Intransigente* (PI), *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCeDé), and *Afirmación para una República Igualitaria* (ARI)), they have only had temporary relevance and have scarcely reached 10% of the provincial votes (Prats 2012).

According to the national electoral system seventy national deputies are chosen by halves every two years, and the allocation of seats is decided using a D'Hondt formula. Moreover, as any other district, the province sends three legislators to the National Senate -two of them correspond to the majority party and the other to the first minority. The provincial legislature is composed by a Senate of 50 members and a Chamber of Deputies of 100 legislators. Deputies and Senators are also chosen by halves in eight electoral districts (sections) of variable magnitude (3 to 19) and allocated by Hare formula. Although the province can celebrate elections concurrently with the national calendar or not, Buenos Aires has always held its elections together with the national ones. Consequently, national, provincial and municipal elections have been simultaneously held since 1983.

Regarding the provincial organic law of municipalities (law 6769/58, articles 3 and 4) mayors and city councillors' election has to be held concurrently with the election of provincial senators and deputies. Also, municipal executive and legislative categories constitute one single multi-category list of candidates, being impossible for voters to split their vote. Unlike other provinces, between 1983 and 2003 and until 2011 Buenos Aires did not introduce many important amendments to its electoral law¹⁶.

¹⁶ In 1987 there was a first and small change in electoral rules with marginal effects, from D'Hondt formula to a modified version of Hare (Calvo y Escolar 2005). The most important institutional changes took place between 1993 and 1994, with a series of laws that modified delimitation and territorial distribution of parties, with the main objective of diminishing power of governor Duhalde's challengers (Leiras 2007) and the authorization of governor's reelection. Finally in 2002 Law N° 12.915 established open and simultaneous primaries as the candidate selection procedure, but they were not compulsory and consequently had almost no effects.

5. 2009-2011: Primaries and *Colectoras*

In 2011 Buenos Aires adopted a new system of Open, Compulsory and Simultaneous Primaries (Law 14.086, Decree N°332/11) like the one that had been nationally defined. According to national electoral Law 26.571 (2009), provincial primaries could be simultaneous with national ones.

Interestingly, both last national electoral reform in 2009 (decree 443/11, art. 15) and provincial law 14.086¹⁷ (art. 8; decree 332/11) enabled the use of *colectoras* or *listas de adhesión* for general elections. Specifically, in the provincial law *colectoras* are allowed with restrictions for the general elections. That is, according to what law 14.086 (art. 22) states, provincial alliances should be replicated for all elective categories, therefore not allowing any parties making up an alliance for one category to present their own individual ballot for another category (which is the usual manner to set up *colectoras*). However, regarding the already mentioned *listas espejo* (mirror lists), law 26.571 abolished the existing legal loopholes that had enabled their reproduction, thus clarifying electoral offer. Different ballots with identical candidates would be no longer admitted.

However, in the first elections held under the new legislation there was a huge drop in the number of *colectoras* (see Graph Nr. 1). This was a clear consequence of the referred novel provincial dispositions regarding the required uniformity of alliances across categories. Besides, primaries compelled parties to establish alliances much earlier in the electoral calendar, thus leaving less leeway to join lists after primaries.

6. The evolution of *Colectoras* in Buenos Aires.

Our unit of analysis is each ballot from every election held in the province between 1983 and 2011¹⁸, specifically every ballot containing an *apparentment*.

When a complete horizontal ballot (*lista sábana horizontal*) is a one-party-ballot, all lists of candidates in the ballot hold the same “number” (*número de lista*) disregarding the category, for every party is legally awarded an identification number to compete in the election. In such cases, no *colectoras* are observed. Thus, we could first identify a *colectora* just by recognizing municipal lists holding different numbers with respect to the provincial or national categories in the same ballot. The category holding the

¹⁷ Sanctioned just five days after the national reform was passed by the national congress.

¹⁸ However, in the elections of 1983 not a single *colectora* was presented. This strategy first appeared in 1985.

colectora always was either Provincial Deputies or Senators, just with a few exceptions where the heading category was either Governor or National Deputies.

Listas espejo were also identified by checking the names in the same category's lists. We tallied the *listas espejo* (when two or more parties present the same candidates for the same category) as one even though those same candidates appeared in two or more lists.

The following table summarizes the amount of *colectoras* and *listas espejo* by election specifying the quantity that each party contributes to the total. Graph Nr. 1, associated to the table, condenses the temporal evolution of *colectoras* and *espejos*. The initial year is 1985 for in 1983 no appointments were registered.

Table Nr. 1: *Colectoras* and *Mirror Lists* by election (1985-2011)


Election Year	Party*	Nr. of <i>Colectoras</i> by Party	Total Nr. of <i>Colectoras</i>	Nr. of <i>Listas Espejo</i> by Party	Total Nr. of <i>Listas Espejo</i>
2011	FpV	17	18	0	0
	FAP	1		0	
2009	FpV	136	381	23	30
	ACyS	219		7	
	NE	2		0	
	Unión-PRO	24		0	
2007	FpV	174	290	0	5
	UNA	99		5	
	Fte. CC	15		0	
	Soc. Justa	1		0	
	UCR	1		0	
2005	ARI	2	50	0	0
	Al. Acción Federalista por Bs. As.	3		0	
	Fte. Bonaer. Autonom. Aut.**	14		0	
	Fte. Justicialista	8		0	
	FpV	4		0	
	Fte. Pop. Autentico	13		0	
	Fte. UCR	1		0	
	MID	2		0	
	Partido Justicialista	1		0	
	Propuesta Republicana	1		0	
	UCR	1		0	
2003	Al. Acción Federalista por Bs. As.	19	77	0	3***
	Alianza AFEBA-FUL	2		0	
	Alianza AFEBA-VIDA	1		0	
	Polo Soc. para la Victoria	1		0	
	Fte. Cambia Buenos Aires	14		0	
	Fte. Unión por Bs. As.	2		0	
	MID	3		3	
	Mov. Fed. Recrear	7		0	

	Socialista Auténtico	3		0	
	Ptdo. Justicialista	1		0	
	Mov. Por la Justicia Social	1		0	
	Ptdo. Nac. Constit. UNIR	2		0	
	UCR	21		3	
2001	Alianza	72	94	1	2
	Fte. Vecinalista Pcial.	21		1	
	Ptdo. Unidad Federalista	1		0	
1999	Alianza	16	17	0	0
	Ptdo. Nac. Constitucional	1		0	
1997	Alianza	14	17	0	2
	Fte. Jus. Bonaerense	2		1	
	MODIN	1		1	
1995	MODIN	2	2	0	0
1993	UCEDE	3	6	0	0
	Al. Bonaerense para el Crecimiento	2		0	
	Mov. Pop. Bonaerense Mo. Po. Bo	1		0	
1987	Ptdo. Conservador Autonomista	1	2	0	0
	Al. UCEDE - Demócrata Progresista	1		0	
1985	Alianza del Centro UCD- PCA	2	2	0	0

Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1.

* We refer to the party competing at the highest level of government: either Provincial Senators or Deputies - ****Frente Bonaerense Autonomista Auténtico - ***** Here we do not sum the six mirror lists that were registered, for in this particular case the six same lists of candidates at the municipal level belong to just three parties. This could be a case of an inverse *colectora* from the municipal to the provincial level.

Graph Nr. 1 - Colectoras and Mirror Lists by election (1985-2011)



Source: Own elaboration based on data from Federal Court Nr 1.

Graph Nr. 1 shows that apparentments developed over the last fifteen years starting in 1997, reaching their ceiling in 2009 and plummeting afterwards.

Then we examined the character of the parties involved in the apparentments. As we have already stated, since 1983 provincial and local elections have been held concurrently with the national calendar. This certainly allowed the appearance of *colectoras*. 1997 was a critical moment for the provincial ruling party. The then peronist governor Eduardo Duhalde, was trying to place himself as the future candidate for the presidency while the national leader of the PJ, president Menem, was looking for his re-election. Within the province traditional alignments began to be tested and local leaders' support became crucial. Wherever local loyalty was not clear; the governor negotiated the support of small parties at the local level, building *colectoras*.

In following elections *colectoras* increased. By 2007 we can easily observe a first peak. At that moment the internal dispute within the peronist party/*Frente para la Victoria*¹⁹ (FpV) was part of the explanation once again. President Kirchner (FpV) tried to collect as many votes as possible at the local level as he was fighting the “mother of all fights” in Buenos Aires against Duhalde’s apparatus. That same year an alliance between the UCR and part of the Peronism (MID/*Sociedad Justa*) resulted in the emergence of *Una Nación Avanzada* (UNA). *Colectoras* were a key strategy for both.

Disclosing the nature of the *colectoras* identified in 2007, most *colectoras* of UNA²⁰, were UCR or *Sociedad Justa* lists: the 88%. Here *colectoras* were not from small parties, but in fact they expressed the lack of consensus among the parties of the national or provincial front at the municipal level. Hence, they did express multilevel incongruence. The FpV, with the largest amount of *colectoras*: 174, gathered votes from its traditional small allies: *Movimiento H.A.C.E.R por Buenos Aires* and *VIDA*, as well as from municipal organizations.

In 2009 the FpV basically had two *colectoras* in the category of city councilors: the *Partido Justicialista* and *Partido Progreso Social*. As table Nr. 1 shows, these two parties made up 108 of the party’s 134 *colectoras*, plus 22 from *Movimiento H.A.C.E.R por Buenos Aires*, *Partido de la Victoria*, and *Partido Verde Bonaerense*. The other 4 *colectoras* belonged to four other parties²¹, whereas the 23 *listas espejo* identified also corresponded either to the *Partido Justicialista* or to the *Partido Progreso Social*. Again, the presence of the PJ as an apparentment list of the FpV in many municipalities

¹⁹ Intrinsically peronist, the FpV is a center-left electoral front founded in 2003 in order to present Nestor Kirchner’s candidacy for President.

²⁰ The Alliance, designed with the aim of supporting Roberto Lavagna’s presidential candidacy, was dissolved that same year.

²¹ Frente Unidad de Todos (1432), San Martín con Honestidad y Trabajo (1430), and Movimiento para la Victoria (1409) and Concertación Vecinal marplatense (1431).

expressed the lack of consensus within Peronism throughout local districts in a moment in which the ruling FpV was being critically challenged²². The other three parties holding *colectoras* for city councilors were the *Acuerdo Cívico y Social* (ACyS)²³, which had the largest number of *colectoras* (219), and *Unión-PRO*²⁴ (23). The ACyS' huge number of *colectoras* was mainly a result of the intention of the parties making up the alliance to present their own candidates in addition to the ACyS candidates at the municipal level. Similarly to the case of UNA in 2007, *colectoras* appeared in municipalities where those same parties could not come to an agreement on the candidates for that level of government. Just 19 of those 219 *colectoras* belonged to 16 municipal parties and a district party. The ACyS also had 7 *listas espejo*. Therefore, for these elections we find a total of 30 *listas espejo*, which in comparison to all the other elections in the period, is a particularly large amount.

Together with the increase of apparentments, another peculiar feature appeared in 2009, making the electoral offer even more complex: testimonial candidacies (*candidaturas testimoniales*). Such tactic was mainly employed by the national and provincial ruling party, the FpV, and involved the nomination of well-known legislative or executive officials (national deputies, mayors, etc.) for elective offices they would not take if being elected. Such candidates would remain in their former offices only serving as a “testimony” of their support to the government by being on the list and as an appeal to the voters in need of informational shortcuts. Of course, they entailed a setback for clarity in the political offer.

Finally, in 2011 we find a deep decrease in the number of *colectoras*. For provincial senators and deputies, only the party FpV joined in apparentments with 9 different parties that presented candidates for municipal mayor. It did so in at least one municipality in all of the eight electoral sections, adding up 17 municipalities in which the FpV had more than one candidate for mayor.

Regarding the quality of the parties linked to the FpV for the category of mayor, six out of nine were municipal parties, i.e., small parties only able to play at the local level and which could therefore find it useful to adhere their own list of candidates to a larger

²² We refer to the so-called farmer's rebellion that took place in 2008 and that critically defined the political context for the elections of 2009 (see: Calvo and Murillo 2012)

²³ An alliance between Coalición Cívica, GEN, Consenso Federal, Partido Socialista and Unión Cívica Radical.

²⁴ An alliance between Partido Federal, Unión del Centro Democrático, Recrear para el Crecimiento, Propuesta Republicana (former Compromiso para el Cambio), Unión Celeste y Blanco, Partido Popular Cristiano Bonaerense and Partido Nuevo Buenos Aires.

party playing at the provincial/national level. The other two parties that decided to link their lists to the FpV at the local level were the *Frente Social de la Provincia de Buenos Aires*, a byproduct of the FpV and an organization powerful enough to present its own list for the municipal executive in more than one district, thus an important actor in the province. It was a result of an alliance between the *Partido Hacer* and *Partido Verde Bonaerense*, which had left the FpV. The second party was, as in 2009, *Partido Progreso Social*, an already traditional ally of the FpV. Although these two parties were *colectoras* of the FpV, both were part of the FpV alliance at the provincial level. This illustrates how apparentments can be used for solving internal discrepancies between arenas without wasting the votes of those parties that decide to compete independently.

Finally, the *Frente Amplio Porgresista* (FAP) presented one *colectora* for the local executive in the municipality of Rivadavia, where it stuck its ballot to a local party.

All in all, evidence shows that parties presenting candidates for the upper categories (president, national senators and deputies, governor, and provincial senators and deputies) have competed with more than one list at the municipal level. In municipalities where a local party is powerful enough to be of interest of a party or alliance at the provincial/national level, what happens is that both parties link themselves through an apparentment list in order to take advantage of the coattail effects that can certainly work in either direction.

Of course, apparentments also develop between national and provincial categories. For instance, in 2011 the elected president²⁵, Cristina Kirchner, presented, together with its lists of candidates for the national categories, two different candidates for governor in the province: one under its own party label, and another from the party *Nuevo Encuentro*. The latter was the only *colectora* for gubernatorial elections.

The notably smaller quantity of *colectoras* in 2011 compared to 2009 and 2007 may have been a result of the first implementation of primaries in the province, and of the limits that the provincial law set for incongruent alliances among levels. First, the mechanical effect of primaries themselves plus the fact that their implementation anticipated and shortened the period for parties to negotiate or coordinate with each other could explain the big drop. Second, the law limits the coalitional leeway parties have: the party joining a superior category of another party at the local level has to be a

²⁵ The FpV presidential candidate won in all the provinces and with big margins of victory. Only one peculiar province was lost: San Luis.

member of the superior alliance in order to be a *colectora*²⁶. For another thing, the absence of the apartment mechanism of *listas espejo*, may have been a consequence of its banning through Law 26.571 (art. 22) to which the province mostly subsumed itself.

6. 1. The spatial dimension of *Colectoras* between 1997 and 2011

Given that for the election of provincial legislative categories the province is organized in eight electoral sections, each comprising different sets of municipalities of variable electoral weight, we hereby present (table Nr. 2) the amount of *colectoras* registered per electoral section in the period 1997-2011 so as to tackle whether there is an observable geographical pattern. Secondly, in order to measure the real significance of those gross figures, they are weighted by the number of municipalities in each section.

Table Nr. 2 - *Colectoras* per Electoral Section

Electoral Section	Total Nr. Of <i>Colectoras</i> per Section	Weighted by Nr. of Municipalities²⁷
1	240	10
2	108	7,2
3	203	10,6
4	95	5,0
5	139	5,3
6	116	5,3
7	36	4,5
8	8	8


Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1

Graph Nr. 2 presents the median and the typically asymmetric distribution of the total number of *colectoras* registered in the last eight elections per section. As it can be observed, the data exhibits a non-homogeneous distribution regarding each median. Not surprisingly, sections 1 and 3 exhibit the highest medians. Also, the size of the boxplots for these sections shows a more scattered pattern of observations, denoting a strong variation in the number of *colectoras* in the different elections.

²⁶ Similarly, since 2003 the National Electoral Court (CNE) began to set jurisprudence in this respect, stating that parties joining their lists should have a legal link. Such jurisprudence resulted in the doctrine of the legal link.

²⁷ Section 1:24 municipalities; Section 2:15; Section 3:19; Section 4:19; Section 5:27; Section 6:22; Section 7:8; Section 8:1.

Graph Nr. 2 – Median and Distribution of the Nr. of *Colectoras* per Section Considering the Total Registered in every Election (1997-2011).



Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1
 * There's an error in the title. The graph comprehends the period 1997-2011

As both the table and graph show, sections 1 and 3 are the ones in which the phenomenon has been more intense. Although section 1 is the one with the largest total amount, it is surpassed by section 3 after their numbers are municipally weighted.

This finding evidences the concentration of *colectoras* in the municipalities of these two sections, with the exception of 1999 and 2001 elections for section 1. Not surprisingly, these sections comprehend the *Conurbano Bonaerense*, the most densely populated and the most politically relevant area, and where Peronist mayors have traditionally ruled.

These two sections are the main stage for the so-called *barones del conurbano*. The *barones del conurbano* are the powerful and politically relevant mostly peronist mayors of the 24 municipalities that make up the *conurbano* area that surrounds the City of Buenos Aires. These mayors have a history of long periods in power in an area with high poverty rates and a disadvantaged population²⁸.


Therefore, we wonder whether the spatial concentration of *colectoras* and the political features of that area, can tell us anything about the logic behind this electoral mechanism. We presume that, considering the electoral sections in which this phenomenon has been embedded, it could be related to the development of Peronism.

As graph Nr. 3 shows, considering the number of *colectoras* that each of the main parties joined per section in all the elections between 1997 and 2011, for the FpV/PJ

²⁸ According to Auyero (2002, 38), in many areas of the *Conurbano* a way of satisfying the need for food and health services of the poor is through the party, which happens to have direct access to state resources (municipal, in this case).

(leading) and the ACyS/FAP the median is considerably higher than for the other parties. For the FpV/PJ and UCR/Alianza, the observations are quite homogeneously distributed around the median thus exhibiting a considerably normal distribution across sections. The party PRO does not appear in the graph for it only had one significant observation in section 4 in the whole period. This case can be observed in Graph Nr. 4.


Graph Nr. 3 – Median and Distribution of the Nr. of *Colectoras* per Main Party and by Section in the period 1997-2011



Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1

Notwithstanding this, we should also be able to find a greater incidence of the PJ in the two sections where the larger frequencies were found. Graph Nr. 4 shows that the partisan share of *colectoras* over the total per section exhibits the prevalence of the PJ/FpV in almost every section. However, sections 1 and 3 are the ones in which the gross quantity of *colectoras* in hands of the PJ is larger. For instance, the 46% in section 5 stands for 58 apartments and the 43% in section 2 represents 45, whereas the 40% and 44% in sections 1 and 3 stand for 73 and 68 *colectoras* respectively.

Graph Nr. 4 - *Colectoras* by Party and Electoral Section




Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1

Finally we take a look at the phenomenon at a more disaggregated level of analysis: municipalities. In order to do so, we first present a map of the province (Nr. 1) displaying the sectional pattern of the distribution of *colectoras* in the period 1999²⁹-2011. This map illustrates how concentrated the phenomenon has been in sections 1 and 3. Then, map Nr. 2 exhibits the municipal distribution of such aggregated numbers. It shows that 33 municipalities report the largest amount of *colectoras* between 1999 and 2011, and that they are clearly concentrated in the aforementioned sections. Among these municipalities the range goes between 10 and 19 *colectoras*. Moreover, as maps 3 and 4 more clearly depict, 10 out of those 33 municipalities belong to section 1 and 11 to section 3, while the rest are mostly disseminated amongst the other six sections. Therefore, these two sections contain 66.67% of the 33 municipalities with more *colectoras* in the considered period.


²⁹ From here we take 1999 instead of 1997. This is an error that should be fixed. Still, the missed observations of 1997 are only 17.

Map Nr. 1 – Total Nr. of *Colectoras* per Electoral Section (1999-2011)



Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1 - GIS.

Map Nr. 2 - Total Nr. of *Colectoras* per Section and Municipality (1999-2011)



Source: Own elaboration based on party ballots and data from the Federal Court Nr. 1 – GIS (See: detailed information per municipality in the appendix)

dependent variable, we run a random-effects negative binomial regression model. This model let us estimate the determinants of an over-dispersed count dependent variable. The model is also suitable because we have cross-sectional time series data, i.e, data that varies within units and across units. To do so, we only consider the elections that took place between 1997 and 2009, for it was then when *colectoras* mostly developed.

Table Nr. 1.³⁰

GEE population-averaged model		Number of obs	=	1071
Group variable:	code	Number of groups	=	134
Link:	log	Obs per group: min	=	7
Family:	negative binomial(k=1)	avg	=	8.0
Correlation:	exchangeable	max	=	8
Scale parameter:	1	Wald chi2(1)	=	63.71
		Prob > chi2	=	0.0000

NColectoras	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
nepmuni	.2391677	.0299634	7.98	0.000	.1804405	.2978948
_cons	-.4229886	.107976	-3.92	0.000	-.6346176	-.2113596

Table Nr. 2.

GEE population-averaged model		Number of obs	=	1071
Group variable:	code	Number of groups	=	134
Link:	log	Obs per group: min	=	7
Family:	negative binomial(k=1)	avg	=	8.0
Correlation:	exchangeable	max	=	8
Scale parameter:	1	Wald chi2(4)	=	15.25
		Prob > chi2	=	0.0042

NColectoras	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
margenvictoria	-.006025	.0034041	-1.77	0.077	-.0126969	.0006469
intendentePJ	.2455878	.0932302	2.63	0.008	.06286	.4283156
intendenteUCR	-.1633685	.1117767	-1.46	0.144	-.3824469	.0557098
ElecGov	-.0828616	.0797145	-1.04	0.299	-.2390992	.073376
_cons	.4935059	.0794717	6.21	0.000	.3377443	.6492675

We first find that the larger the municipal NEP ('nepmuni' coefficient), the larger the amount of *colectoras* in every municipality (see table 1). However, the problem with such coefficient is that the NEP itself comprises *colectoras* for the index cannot distinguish if parties are *colectoras* or not. Therefore, this coefficient would not provide much explanation on the variance of the dependent variable; it would just reflect its development.

³⁰ The influence of the Municipal NEP (nepmuni) on the amount of appointments is considered separately from the other variables because it is deeply correlated with the margin of victory. Then, when the model considers them together, the coefficients vary even though the incidence of the municipal NEP remains almost the same. This is a consequence of the profound correspondence between a largest NEP and a smaller margin of victory and of the fact that both variables are estimated on municipal votes.

Secondly, we measure the incidence of gubernatorial elections on the number of *colectoras* bearing in mind that by doing so we are also considering the co-existence of elections for Mayor³¹. The ‘ElecGob’ coefficient in table Nr. 2 exhibits that whenever provincial executive elections take place, the number of *colectoras* is expected to decline in every municipality. This finding confirms a widely accepted presumption: that executive elections in the upper tier may reduce the coordination problems that parties and factions may face in the lower one. Why? Because of the electoral system’s mechanical and psychological effects. Specifically, the majoritarian formula to elect governor has powerful mechanical and psychological effects that lead to less competing parties in that category. This logically results in a reduction of linked lower-tier categories, i.e., *colectoras*. Of course this is not expected to happen so easily when provincial elections are legislative. It also ratifies that executive candidacies are expected to carry lower-tier candidates to victory (coattails) and that; as a consequence, it is not necessary to diversify the municipal lines of support.

The model also considers the incidence of the margin of victory (‘margenvictoria’). As theoretically expected, this coefficient shows that the smaller the municipal margin of victory (either executive or legislative for both categories go together in a single ballot), that is, the more competitive the municipality, the larger the amount of *colectoras*. Presumably, the less concentrated the vote is, the harder the strategic decision of who will ensure a better electoral outcome in the lower tier would be. But this assumption would only make sense if the regression presented the same result considering a small margin of victory in a former election and a large amount of *colectoras* in the following one, as a strategic consequence of such small margin. We ran the model, but the coefficient was insignificant. Hence, the only explanation the statistical analysis provides is that the amount of *colectoras* rises so as to widen the possibility of getting more votes for a superior category and, as a consequence, the margin of victory is expected to decline. The problem here is evident: there’s an apparent circular relationship that requires qualitative clarification.

In terms of the partisan bias *colectoras* may have, the model indicates that whenever the mayor belongs to the Peronist Party (‘intendentePJ’) *colectoras* grow. On the contrary, when the mayor belongs to the Radical Party (‘intendenteUCR’) the chances of finding more *colectoras* diminish. Then, a larger amount of apartments is associated with

³¹ Mayors are always elected concurrently with the Governor.

Peronism. This finding is quite interesting for it confirms the geographical pattern previously found: the concentration of *colectoras* in the *Conurbano Bonaerense*, where the most powerful Peronist mayors have traditionally ruled and where the party historically developed a network of minor associated parties or factions and a heterogeneous and decentralized base of support (Levitsky 2005).

However, the results exhibit some endogeneity problems based on the fact that all the independent variables considered have an origin in citizens' preferences. This suggests that the factors most clearly explaining the increase or decrease of *colectoras* might reside in intra-elite coordination aspects.

So, in order to add to the statistical results, we first examined the news reporting the decisions made by the main political actors in 2007 and 2009, when *colectoras* grew exponentially. Then, we conducted a series of in-depth interviews to provincial and municipal political actors.

In line with the positive coefficient between larger municipal NEPs, smaller margins of victory and larger amounts of *colectoras*, we found that a main objective of municipal appointments has been to solve internal disputes in general elections. Likewise, appointments have been extensively used wherever partisan alliances at the provincial level could not be replicated at the municipal level. In those cases, the members of the alliance compete with each other for local offices joining the same superior category, that is, as *colectoras*. Bearing in mind that the provincial or national leadership of every party or coalition should enable *colectoras*, they become an instrument of negotiation with the local leaders. In fact, they are generally rejected by municipal incumbents. Why? As 2007 elections have shown, traditional municipal incumbents of the PJ could be displaced by candidates competing in different appointments with the same superior category. Moreover, even if they can win the election, incumbents find *colectoras* harmful for they can jeopardize their majority in the municipal council. From their point of view, *colectoras* negatively affect local governability for they can divide the popular vote and fragment the local council.

That said, it is easier to understand why a larger amount of *colectoras* correlates with a smaller margin of victory and a larger municipal NEP. The existence of appointments means that local incumbents have to face more competitive electoral contests, even though they may be competing with other candidates supporting the same provincial or national candidate/s. What's more, considering the partisan bias we statistically found, i.e., that whenever the mayor belongs to the Peronist Party the number of *colectoras*

grows; qualitative evidence demonstrates that the use of *colectoras* is a predominantly peronist strategy. It also reveals that often the different local parties that the PJ has as *colectoras* are not autonomous or even pre-existing parties, but electoral tools built ad-hoc by the PJ itself in order to get more votes from different local candidates or to effectively challenge the once-loyal incumbent. For instance, the reason for having so many *colectoras* in 2009 was the profound crisis of the national government with the rural unions during 2008. The crisis had divided the party in the province into kirchnerism and dissident peronism. In a difficult electoral context in which the dissident faction was gaining support, the national executive (kirchnerism) tried to draw votes from the bottom to the top. How? By nominating testimonial candidacies and negotiating *colectoras* with other philo-kirchnerist parties in the toughest districts. Compared to 2007 when all the municipal parties wanted to join the presidential list of Cristina F. de Kirchner so as to have a better electoral performance, 2009 somehow operated the other way around. All in all, there's a widespread peronist tendency to employ *colectoras* that could be largely explained by its predominant position in the province and, essentially, in the *Conurbano Bonaerense*.

7. Concluding Remarks.

By and large, through the analysis of apparentments this paper provides a clue for the understanding of partisan fragmentation at the municipal level while evidencing the electoral relevance of Buenos Aires' municipalities.

Specifically, we find that the number of apparentments increases the more competitive the municipality. That is, when the margin of victory decreases and the municipal NEP rises, the amount of *colectoras* grows. This implies the existence of a need of the superior category to widen the base of support at the municipal level so as to reduce uncertainty. However, as stated, this relationship could be the other way around. In fact, interviews suggest so. Besides, apparentments seem to spread when the mayor belongs to the Peronist Party. This finding correlates with the territorial concentration of the phenomenon in the *Conurbano Bonaerense*, where the PJ is stronger. However, statistical results exhibit some endogeneity problems associated to the sole employment of electoral variables. Then, the review of intra-elite coordination information offers more interesting hints.

Even though we presumed *colectoras* could help small parties survive at the local level, this research does not provide enough evidence to confirm that. Indeed, who, when and why take advantage of this electoral mechanism needs to be explored. However, what we do find is that *colectoras* are mostly used by Peronism. Also, that sometimes those parties joining Peronism at the local level are mere electoral labels designed to track more votes to the superior category. That is, they are not autonomous parties but electoral machines usually serving peronist needs. What's more, Peronism and particularly Kirchnerism in 2007 and 2009 used *colectoras* both to subordinate some Kirchnerist mayors when necessary, and to wane traditional Peronism in the province. This, we presume, could explain the at least apparent difference between the party system at the municipal and provincial level.

In fact, the growth of *colectoras* in 2007 and 2009 reveals the influence that national Kirchnerism exerted on Buenos Aires' municipalities, for *colectoras* were introduced from the top even though local mayors fought against them. While *Unión-PRO* and *Acuerdo Cívico* widely used them too, the peak of 2009 clearly reflects the need of national kirchnerism to widen the electoral bases after the profound crisis with the rural unions during 2008. Kirchnerism needed to find the way to improve its electoral performance even by affecting their municipal incumbents. For instance, in 2009 not even Mussi, the peronist mayor of Berazategui that had ruled the municipality since 1987 could prevent the national government from placing *colectoras* next to his list. Then, *colectoras* revealed the coordination problems within the FpV, and served as a conduit to make the most of those problems.

Also, *colectoras* express party-system incongruence across levels. Our data revealed that *colectoras* generally end up being the product of local competition between parties that, at the provincial or national level, make up alliances.

Notwithstanding all this, this preliminary analysis opens many questions: does the observed trend in the province correspond with what happened other provinces? Is there any special feature in the province explaining the proliferation of *colectoras*? How do coattail effects work in the presence of *colectoras*?

Appendix: 1999-2011 data per Municipality

Section	Municipality	2011	2009	2007	2005	2003	2001	1999	SUM
5	Lezama
1	General San Martin	1	8	5	1	3	1	.	19
3	Esteban Echevarria	.	7	5	2	1	3	.	18
3	Lomas de Zamora	.	6	7	2	2	1	.	18
3	Ezeiza	.	8	5	1	2	1	.	17
3	Berazategui	.	5	4	1	2	3	.	15
2	Pergamino	.	6	5	.	3	.	.	14
2	Zarate	1	6	4	.	.	3	.	14
1	Jose C. Paz	.	5	2	1	4	1	.	13
1	Malvinas Argentinas	.	6	4	1	1	1	.	13
1	San Isidro	.	6	2	2	2	1	.	13
1	San Miguel	.	4	5	2	1	1	.	13
5	Balcarce	.	5	5	1	.	.	2	13
1	Escobar	.	5	5	.	2	.	.	12
1	Lujan	.	5	6	.	.	1	.	12
1	Marcos Paz	1	4	5	.	2	.	.	12
3	Avellaneda	.	2	4	2	2	2	.	12
3	Florencio Varela	.	7	2	1	1	1	.	12
3	San Vicente	.	6	4	.	.	2	.	12
1	Hurlingham	1	4	5	1	.	.	.	11
1	Moron	.	4	4	1	1	1	.	11
2	San Pedro	1	4	4	.	.	2	.	11
3	Ensenada	1	2	2	.	5	1	.	11
4	Junin	.	7	3	1	.	.	.	11
5	Pinamar	1	6	3	1	.	.	.	11
7	Olavarria	1	4	2	1	1	2	.	11
3	Berisso	.	4	4	.	.	2	.	10
3	La Matanza	.	4	3	1	.	2	.	10
3	Magdalena	.	6	2	.	.	2	.	10
4	Leandro N. Alem	1	3	2	1	1	2	.	10
4	Lincoln	.	4	4	.	.	2	.	10
5	Castelli	.	4	5	.	1	.	.	10
6	Coronel Suarez	1	4	2	.	.	3	.	10
6	Puan	.	4	3	1	2	.	.	10
1	Pilar	.	2	3	1	2	1	.	9
1	Tres de Febrero	.	5	2	1	1	.	.	9
1	Vicente Lopez	.	2	5	1	1	.	.	9
3	Cañuelas	.	2	5	2	.	.	.	9
5	Chascomus	.	3	6	9
5	General Pueyrredon	1	4	2	1	1	.	.	9
6	General Lamadrid	.	4	2	.	.	3	.	9
1	Ituzaingo	.	2	3	1	1	.	1	8

1	San Fernando	.	2	4	1	1	.	.	8
1	Suipacha	.	2	4	.	2	.	.	8
2	San Nicolas	1	3	4	8
3	Lobos	.	4	1	1	.	2	.	8
3	Quilmes	1	1	4	2	.	.	.	8
4	Pehuajo	.	3	3	.	1	1	.	8
4	Rivadavia	1	.	2	1	2	2	.	8
5	General Alvarado	.	3	3	.	.	.	2	8
6	Bahia Blanca	.	5	2	.	1	.	.	8
6	Coronel Rosales	1	4	2	.	.	1	.	8
8	La Plata	1	.	4	.	1	2	.	8
1	Merlo	.	3	3	1	.	.	.	7
1	Moreno	.	1	2	2	1	1	.	7
2	Arrecifes	.	3	4	7
2	Baradero	.	2	5	7
2	Exaltacion de la Cruz	.	3	1	.	1	.	2	7
3	Almirante Brown	.	2	2	.	3	.	.	7
3	Brandsen	.	1	4	.	.	2	.	7
4	9 de Julio	.	5	.	.	.	2	.	7
4	Chacabuco	.	4	3	7
5	Ayacucho	.	4	3	7
5	General Paz	.	3	4	7
6	Saavedra	.	3	2	.	1	1	.	7
1	General Rodriguez	.	2	2	1	1	.	.	6
1	Tigre	.	2	2	1	1	.	.	6
2	San Andres de Giles	.	2	2	.	.	.	2	6
3	Lanus	.	2	3	1	.	.	.	6
3	Presidente Peron	.	2	2	.	.	2	.	6
5	Dolores	.	1	3	.	1	.	1	6
5	Necochea	.	2	.	1	2	1	.	6
6	Adolfo Alsina	.	3	2	.	.	1	.	6
6	Adolfo Gonzales Chaves	.	3	.	.	1	1	1	6
6	Coronel Dorrego	.	4	.	.	2	.	.	6
6	Coronel Pringles	.	3	2	.	.	1	.	6
6	Tres Arroyos	.	3	.	.	.	3	.	6
7	Azul	.	2	.	.	1	2	1	6
1	Campana	.	5	5
2	Capitan Sarmiento	.	2	3	5
2	Carmen de Areco	1	3	.	.	1	.	.	5
2	Colon	.	2	3	5
2	Salto	.	.	5	5
2	San Antonio de Areco	.	3	2	5
3	Punta Indio	.	2	2	.	.	1	.	5
5	General Belgrano	.	2	2	.	1	.	.	5
5	La Costa	.	3	.	1	1	.	.	5
5	Las Flores	.	4	1	5
5	Monte	.	2	.	.	1	.	2	5
6	Benito Juarez	.	3	.	.	1	1	.	5

7	Bolivar	.	4	.	1	.	.	.	5
7	General Alvear	.	3	2	5
1	General Las Heras	.	2	2	4
1	Mercedes	1	.	2	.	1	.	.	4
1	Navarro	.	4	4
2	Ramallo	.	1	3	4
2	Rojas	.	3	1	4
4	Bragado	.	2	.	.	.	2	.	4
4	General Arenales	.	2	2	4
4	General Villegas	.	2	.	.	.	2	.	4
4	Hipolito Yrigoyen	.	.	2	.	.	2	.	4
5	General Guido	.	2	1	.	.	.	1	4
5	General Madariaga	.	1	3	4
5	Mar Chiquita	.	1	2	1	.	.	.	4
5	San Cayetano	.	2	.	.	1	.	1	4
6	Daireaux	.	3	.	.	.	1	.	4
6	Guamini	.	2	.	.	1	.	1	4
6	Tornquist	.	2	2	4
6	Tres Lomas	.	2	.	.	.	2	.	4
4	Alberti	.	1	.	.	.	2	.	3
4	Florentino Ameghino	.	.	2	.	.	1	.	3
4	General Pinto	.	2	.	.	.	1	.	3
4	General Viamonte	.	2	.	.	.	1	.	3
5	General Lavalle	.	1	2	3
5	Maipu	.	3	3
5	Tandil	.	2	.	1	.	.	.	3
6	Salliquelo	.	1	2	3
7	Roque Perez	.	1	2	3
7	Tapalque	.	1	.	.	.	2	.	3
4	Carlos Casares	.	2	2
4	Carlos Tejedor	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	2
4	Trenque Lauquen	2	.	2
5	Loberia	.	2	2
5	Rauch	.	1	.	.	1	.	.	2
5	Tordillo	.	2	2
5	Villa Gesell	.	1	.	1	.	.	.	2
6	Monte Hermoso	.	1	.	.	.	1	.	2
6	Patagones	2	.	2
6	Pellegrini	.	2	2
6	Saladillo	.	1	1	2
6	Villarino	.	.	2	2
7	25 de Mayo	.	1	.	1	.	.	.	2
5	Pila	.	1	1
6	Laprida	.	1	1
4	Chivilcoy	0

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